The reason for this demand is to find if there is a "hostage entry" in the way. A hostage entryway is when, in the wake of interfacing with the WiFi, any web ask for you makes gets diverted to a login/ToS page. Keeping in mind the end goal to proceed with, you should either login with a username/secret word (or join, then login), or potentially get to the Terms of Service.
The reason Apple does this is on the grounds that you might utilize an application other than the web program. For instance, the main thing you may do is synchronizing your email. In such circumstances, you could never observe the gateway page, and your application will bafflingly neglect to associate with the Internet.
Hence, before your application has an opportunity to get to the system, Apple does this for you. It conveys a demand to the above URL. In the event that the demand gets diverted, then Apple knows there is an entrance. It then dispatches an exchange box, containing Safari, to allow you to login.
The accompanying is the sniffed rendition of the HTTP ask:
Client Agent: CaptiveNetworkSupport/1.0 wispr
One of the inquiries individuals had was whether this was a security issue. the answer is "to a great extent no". It sends no by and by identifiable data. Specifically, it doesn't send any treats. The ask for is produced using the WiFi programming, not Safari. Consequently, any treats you have in Safari won't be sent by means of this demand. I confirmed this myself, by getting to Apple.com by means of Safari and watching treats being sent, yet checking this did not send treats.
Another question is whether this is an assault vector. The answer is "presumably yes". There is a whole other world to the usefulness than a basic HTTP ask. In the event that you look into the watchword "wispr" from the User-Agent string, you'll discover why.
The thought is that keen WiFi entries will distinguish this is a WISPr-supporting gadget, and send back a WISPr message in XML. This permits the iPhone to then login with stored certifications through another XML message. This implies, for instance, you may have the capacity to snatch some person's accreditations with a legitimately arranged WiFi get to point.
I've seen the iPhone manage such a shrewd WiFi get to point, however at the time, I didn't have the nearness of psyche to sniff the trade, so I'm not certain what happened.
Another odd piece of conduct was loging onto an "attwifi" get to point at Starbucks. As you may have listened, utilizing the iPhone on their system is free. The way this works is that the iPhone conveys a demand to "http://attwifi.apple.com/library/test/success.html: an indistinguishable URL from some time recently, however with the "attwifi" in front.
At my neighborhood Starbucks, all web surfing is free. Be that as it may, Windows displays a hostage logon page where you should acknowledge the Terms of Service, however the iPhone doesn't. I expect the gateway distinguishes this URL, and naturally opens up the get to point without doing a redirection. I have to test witha Linux distro keeping in mind the end goal to make sense of what's going on.
No actually identifiable data is sent, so there isn't quite a bit of a protection break.
There is more unpredictability to this component than the straightforward HTTP ask for; there is presumably an approach to assault it.
You can likely design your machine to imitate this demand, and get free WiFi that is planned for iPhones.